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Brentano on intentionality 
Tim Crane 
Brentano’s account of what he called intentionale Inexistenz — what we now call intentionality — 
is without question one of the most important parts of his philosophy, and one of the most 
influential ideas in late 19th-century philosophy. Here I will explain how this idea figures in 
Brentano’s central text, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (Brentano 1995a). I will then 
briefly explain how Brentano’s ideas about intentionality evolved after the first publication of this 
work in 1874, and how they were then misinterpreted by some influential analytic philosophers. 
 The Psychology is in no sense a finished work, and the text that was translated into English 
in 1973 has a somewhat complex history and structure. Brentano originally planned a six-volume 
work. The first two volumes, published together in 1874, form the bulk of what has been passed 
down to Anglophone readers in the 1973/1995 edition (Brentano 1995a). These are Book One, 
‘Psychology as a Science’, and Book Two, ‘Mental Phenomena in General’. Three further volumes 
were planned on each of the fundamental categories of mental phenomena — presentation, 
judgement and the phenomena of love and hate (see CHAP. 9) — and the work was to be concluded 
by a final volume on the immortality of the soul and the mind-body relation. But these last four 
volumes, were never published, though the third exists in draft form. 
 In 1911, part of Book Two was published under the title Von der Klassifikation der 
psychischen Phänomene (‘On the Classification of Mental Phenomena’) along with a substantial 
appendix, in which Brentano developed some of his ideas and indicated some changes of mind. 
After Brentano’s death in 1917, his follower Oskar Kraus produced a second edition of the 
Psychology, published in 1924, which included the appendix from the 1911 book plus some further 
supplementary essays from Brentano’s unpublished writings. The English edition published by 
Routledge and Kegan Paul in 1973 was the work of three translators: Linda L. McAlister, Antos C. 
Rancurello, and D.B. Terrell, with McAlister in charge. The translation was based on Kraus’s 1924 
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edition, and so included not only the appendix and supplementary essays, but also Kraus’s 
footnotes, which attempt to explain Brentano’s ideas. These are marked in the English text by 
numbers, whereas Brentano’s footnotes are indicated by asterixes and other footnote symbols. 
Kraus’s footnotes are of some historical interest, but they are not always entirely accurate in their 
exposition of Brentano’s views, and so must be approached with care. The supplementary material 
in the appendices, however, contains many philosophical insights, and provides a valuable guide to 
the ways in which Brentano’s thought developed after 1874. 
 But we must begin with the core of Brentano’s thinking: the conception of intentionality in 
his 1874 work. What was Brentano’s overall picture of the mind, and what was the role of the 
concept of intentionality in this picture? One central aim of the Psychology was to establish 
psychology as a science distinct from philosophy on the one hand, and physiology on the other. 
Psychology is a science whose data come from experience and introspection – hence this is 
psychology from an empirical standpoint.  
 It’s important to recognise the difference between this use of ‘empirical’ and the 
contemporary conception of psychology as an empirical science. From today’s intellectual 
perspective, to say that psychology is an empirical science implies that it uses the kinds of methods 
(e.g. quantitative or statistical methods) which are characteristic of the other natural sciences. From 
that perspective, Brentano’s introspective psychology is no more empirical than William James’s. (I 
ignore here the distinction Brentano makes between descriptive and genetic psychology; see CHAP. 
3.) But Brentano’s use of the word ‘empirical’ is supposed to indicate that psychology must be 
based on experience: ‘experience alone is my teacher’, as he says in the foreword to the 
Psychology. From his reflections on experience, Brentano aimed to outline the distinction between 
psychology and other sciences. 
 Brentano believed that to make this distinction, there must be a criterion which distinguishes 
its subject-matter from the subject-matter of physical science. In Book One of the Psychology 
Brentano had defined psychology as the ‘science of mental phenomena’, opposing the 
etymologically more precise definition of it as the ‘science of the soul’. To understand what 
Brentano meant by his definition, we have to understand ‘phenomena’ and ‘mental’. 
 In the tradition in which Brentano is writing, ‘phenomenon’ means appearance. Broadly 
speaking, phenomena or appearances are typically contrasted, in various ways, with reality. In the 
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most famous version of this contrast, Kant contrasted phenomena with noumena, or ‘things in 
themselves’. Brentano was an Aristotelian rather than a Kantian, but the emphasis on science’s 
relationship to phenomena rather than things in themselves is nonetheless central to his philosophy. 
Throughout the first chapter of the Psychology, Brentano clearly distinguishes between ‘that which 
really and truly exists’ and appearances or phenomena. He did think there is an underlying reality 
behind the phenomena, but this cannot be what he calls an ‘object of science’. Science can only 
study phenomena. Before we examine what makes a phenomenon mental, we should say something 
about this use of the terms ‘phenomenon’ and ‘science’. 
 These two terms should really be understood together. As we have seen, Brentano believed 
that natural science does not uncover the real nature of things. In particular, physics is not the 
science of bodies because even if we can be said to encounter the properties of bodies, ‘we never 
encounter that something of which these things are properties’ (1995a: 11). All that science can ever 
discover are the appearances of things: these are the ‘physical phenomena’ like ‘light, sound, heat, 
spatial location and locomotion’. As Brentano puts it, ‘what are physical phenomena if not the 
colours, sounds, heat and cold etc., which manifest themselves in our sensations?’ (1995a: 69).  
 Science studies phenomena; that is all that science can do — even if there is an underlying 
reality behind the phenomena. The differences between sciences reduce to the differences between 
the phenomena studied by the sciences. The distinction between psychology and physics therefore 
reduces to the distinction between mental and physical phenomena. It is crucial for understanding 
Brentano’s Psychology that this distinction is a distinction among the ‘data of 
consciousness’ (1995a: 77) and not among entities as we would conceive them in a realist 
metaphysics. Brentano talks approvingly of Lange’s idea of ‘psychology without a soul’ (1995a: 
11). What he means here is that psychology can proceed while being indifferent on the question of 
whether there is a soul: for ‘whether or not there are souls, there are mental phenomena’ (1995a: 
18).  
 Phenomena or appearances are, in a certain way, mind-dependent. However, to say that all 
phenomena are mind-dependent does not mean that all phenomena are mental. So what, then, are 
mental phenomena? Brentano’s answer to this question is the source of his famous doctrine that 
‘intentional inexistence' is the distinguishing mark of mental phenomena. In the most famous 
passage in the book, he writes: 
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Every mental phenomenon is characterised by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional 
(or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a 
content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing) or immanent 
objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as an object within itself, although they do not all 
do so in the same way. In presentation, something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, 
in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired, and so on. (Brentano 1995a: 88) 
This complex passage has given rise to much philosophical discussion; here we can start by 
identifying the key elements of Brentano’s terminology. The ‘object’ of a mental phenomenon is 
what it is directed on. ‘Intentional inexistence’ does not have anything to do with the possible or 
actual non-existence of the object of a mental act; rather, it means that the object ‘exists in’ the 
mental phenomenon itself. Brentano’s introduction of the terminology of intentional inexistence 
does not appeal to, and nor does it presuppose, any distinction between existent and non-existent 
objects of thought. That is not the issue.  
 Since there has been much confusion about this terminology it is worth dwelling a little on 
the difference between Brentano’s assumptions and the typical assumptions of today’s analytic 
philosophy. These days the problem of intentionality is introduced against the background of a 
‘commonsense’ realism which assumes a realm of ordinary objects which exist independently of 
our minds, that relations hold between such objects, and that science studies these objects. I have 
already stressed that this is not Brentano’s starting point. As Barry Smith has nicely put it, ‘one will 
find no coherent interpretation of Brentano’s principle of intentionality so long as one remains 
within the framework of our usual, commonsensical notions of both the mind and its objects’ (1994: 
40). In particular, Brentano’s original 1874 doctrine of intentional inexistence has nothing to do 
with the problem of how we can think about things that do not exist. Although his account of 
intentionality would certainly yield an account of thought about, say, Pegasus, this is only because it 
is an account of thought in general, and not because Pegasus was what was motivating the account. 
 The other terms he uses, ‘relation to a content’, ‘immanent objectivity’ are verbal 
alternatives to ‘intentional inexistence’. Content and object are the same thing for Brentano, and the 
‘objectivity’ of mental phenomena is just a matter of them having an object. The object is immanent 
in the sense that it is ‘in’ the mental act itself, as an Aristotelian form is immanent in a substance, 
unlike ‘transcendent’ Platonic forms, which belong outside of the world of experience. 
 As Smith comments, the thesis that ‘every mental phenomenon includes something as object 
within itself’ is ‘to be taken literally - against the grain of a seemingly unshakeable tendency to 
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twist Brentano’s words at this point’ (Smith 1994: 40). So, taken literally, the intentional inexistence 
of an object really does mean its existence in the mental act itself. The phenomena on which a 
mental act is directed may be physical or mental. In the former case, a mental act has as its object 
something like a sound or a shape or a colour. In the latter case, a mental act would have as its 
object another mental act. For example, one may think about the mental act of hearing a sound. But 
whether physical or mental, the objects of acts are still phenomena and hence, it is important to 
emphasise, fundamentally mind-dependent. Brentano was not, therefore, proposing an account of 
how we think about mind-independent ‘external’ objects. This is because, according to his 
methodological phenomenalism, the phenomena, which are the only objects for science, are not 
‘external’ objects. Physical phenomena have underlying causes, but these underlying causes are not 
the objects of science. (More later on the notion of ‘methodological phenomenalism’.) 
 The background to Brentano’s view is partly Aristotelian, as Brentano indicates in a well-
known footnote (1995a: 88). Aristotle had talked in De Anima about how in perception, the 
perceiving organ takes on the ‘form’ of the perceived object: in seeing something blue, the eye takes 
on blueness without taking on the matter of blueness. Brentano, like Aquinas, wanted to follow 
Aristotle in at least this respect: the proper objects of thought and perception – what it is that we are 
thinking of, and what makes thought possible at all – are actually immanent in the act of thinking, 
and do not transcend the mental act. In this respect, objects of thought may be compared to 
universals on an Aristotelian conception of them, according to which they are immanent in the 
particulars which instantiate them, and do not transcend those particulars. 
 In his illustration of his doctrine of intentional inexistence in the famous quotation, Brentano 
uses these examples: in presentation, something is presented, in judgement, something is judged, 
and in love something is loved. These examples correspond to Brentano’s division of mental 
phenomena into three fundamental classes (1995a: Book Two, Chapter VI). These are the classes of 
(1) presentations, (2) judgement, and (3) phenomena of love and hate (which for Brentano includes 
desire). This classification is original to Brentano, as he himself observes, and a few remarks are 
necessary in order to elucidate Brentano’s conception of the mind. 
 The word which is normally translated here as ‘presentation’ is Vorstellung, a word with a 
rich philosophical history and many connotations. English translations of Kant typically render it as 
‘representation’. The standard translation of Gottlob Frege’s famous paper, ‘The Thought’ translates 
Vorstellung as ‘idea’ (Frege 1920). Frege distinguished there between thoughts (Gedanken), which 
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are objective, mind-independent bearers of truth and falsehood, and ideas, which are subjective, 
mind-dependent and do not serve as the locus of objective truth. ‘Idea’ is sometimes used by 
Brentano’s translators; but it is not always a good term for what he meant, since (like ‘thought’) the 
English word is more naturally used for what a subjective state is directed on (its content or object), 
rather than the state itself. Ideas in the ordinary sense can be discussed impersonally — in an 
encyclopaedia or dictionary, for example — whereas a Vorstellung is meant to be something 
particular to an individual at a given time. As Brentano puts it: ‘by “presentation” we do not mean 
that which is presented, but rather the presenting of it’ (1995a: 79). 
 Presentation, for Brentano, is the fundamental way of being conscious of an object: all other 
mental phenomena involve presentations, and therefore all mental phenomena are conscious. 
Judgement, the second fundamental class of mental phenomena, always involves presentation of an 
object, but this is distinct from the conscious act of judging itself. When one judges X, X is before 
one’s mind in two ways: as the object of the presentation, and as the object of judgement. 
Brentano’s conception of judgement, however, is very different from the conception of many 20th 
century philosophers. Those philosophers who take their lead from Frege, G.E. Moore or Bertrand 
Russell, for example, treat judgement as a relation to a proposition: the kind of thing expressible in 
a sentence, assessable as true or false. Brentano’s theory does not contain propositions, and took all 
judgement to involve affirming or denying the existence of something (see CHAP. 10). To judge that 
it is raining, for example, is to affirm (or better, acknowledge) the existence of rain.  
The third main category of mental phenomena, which Brentano calls ‘the phenomena of 
love and hate’, incorporates not just emotions but also acts of will and desire. These phenomena 
also involve presentation, as every mental phenomenon does, but also involve some kind of 
motivational or affective attitude to the object of the presentation. Much of Book Two of the 
Psychology is concerned with articulating the distinction between the three kinds of mental 
phenomena (see Mulligan 2004 for a useful discussion). 
Two other features of presentation are worth noting here. First, a presentation may be inner 
or outer. An inner presentation may be a feeling or an awareness of some mental act; the objects of 
inner perception are thinking, feeling and willing. The objects of outer presentation or perception 
are warmth, colour, sound and so on (i.e. physical phenomena). A distinctive feature of his view is 
that every mental act is also directed on itself (although in what Brentano called a ‘secondary’ 
sense) as well as on its primary object. Second, in the 1874 book Brentano held that every mental 
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activity involves an emotional or affective element, but he later came to abandon this view and to 
hold instead that some sensations have no such element. He makes clear tis change of mind in the 
1911 edition of selections from the Psychology (1995a: 276). 
 The picture of Brentano’s 1874 views which I have sketched here is in some ways foreign to 
contemporary discussions of intentionality, which, as noted above, tend to assume a commonsense 
realism about the material world, often accompanied by a physicalist conception of the findings of 
science. But placed in wider context, the views should not be so strange. For Brentano’s conception 
of science has a lot in common with the kind of phenomenalism which was common in 19th-century 
philosophy of science, which survived into the 20th century in logical positivism, and which has 
echoes in W.V. Quine’s claim that the purpose of science is to explain and predict the course of 
experience. At the beginning of the Psychology, Brentano mentions Mill approvingly as ‘one of the 
most important advocates of psychology as a purely phenomenalistic science’ (1995a: 14), and he 
expressed sympathy with Ernst Mach’s phenomenalism on a number of occasions (cf. Smith 1994: 
41, n.8). 
 Brentano was not a phenomenalist, because phenomenalism holds that the world is 
constructed from phenomena (e.g. sense-data). Yet as we saw, Brentano did believe that there is a 
world which transcends the phenomena; physical phenomena are ‘signs of something real, which, 
through its causal activity, produces presentations of them’ (1995a: 19). This is what distinguishes 
Brentano from phenomenalism proper: he believes that there is something beyond the phenomena, 
although we can never know it through science. As far as science is concerned, though, 
phenomenalism might as well be true. Peter Simons has helpfully labelled Brentano’s view 
methodological phenomenalism (1995: xvii). 
 By the time the 1911 book came out, Brentano had changed his mind on a number of 
important issues. In the Preface to this 1911 edition, describing the ways in which his views had 
evolved, Brentano wrote that ‘one of the most important innovations is that I am no longer of the 
opinion that mental relation can have something other than a thing as its object’ (1995a: xxvi). This 
is Brentano’s ‘reism’, the idea that only concrete particular things are the objects of thought (see 
CHAP. 16). This was a departure from the view expressed in the 1874 version, which allowed things 
belonging to many different ontological categories to be objects of thought. 
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 Another way in which his view changed was his rejection of the idea that all mental activity 
involves a genuine relation to an object. In the supplementary remarks published in the 1911 book, 
he writes: 
What is characteristic of every mental activity is, as I believe I have shown, the reference to something as an 
object. In this respect, every mental activity seems to be something relational…. If I take something relative 
from among the broad class of comparative relations, something larger or smaller for example, then, if the larger 
thing exists, the smaller one must exist too. If one house is larger than another house, the other house must also 
exist and have a size…. It is entirely different with mental reference. If someone thinks of something, the one 
who is thinking must certainly exist, but the object of his thinking need not exist at all…. For this reason, one 
could doubt whether we are really dealing with something relational here, and not, rather, with something 
somewhat similar to something relational in a certain respect, which might therefore be called ‘quasi-relational’. 
(1995a: 272)  
This is a clear departure from the relational conception of intentionality advanced in 1874, and 
shows similarities with the realist conception of intentionality and intentional objects  famously 
defended by Edmund Husserl in his Logical Investigations (1901). Husserl had argued there that 
although we might say that the non-existent intentional object of a mental act (e.g. the god Jupiter) 
has ‘mental inexistence’ in the act, the truth of the matter is that this ‘immanent, mental object’ is 
not ‘really immanent or mental. But it also does not exist extramentally, it does not exist at 
all’ (Husserl 1901: V, §11). The object of thought, existent or not, transcends the mental act. And the 
mental act is not essentially constituted by the relation to the object. For Husserl, as for Brentano 
after 1911, the mental act cannot be relational but only ‘quasi-relational’ (Relativliches). 
 So what are these non-existent objects of thought? Later in the supplementary remarks, 
Brentano writes that  
all mental references refer to things. In many cases, the things to which we refer do not exist. But we are 
accustomed to saying that they then have being as objects. This is a loose use of the verb ‘to be’ which we 
permit with impunity for the sake of convenience, just as we allow ourselves to speak of the sun ‘rising’ and 
‘setting’. (1995a: 291) 
Brentano does not allow himself to follow his student Alexius Meinong (1910) and his ‘theory of 
objects’, which aimed to investigate intentional objects regardless of their existence. Talk of there 
‘being’ such objects Brentano saw as a kind of loose talk; all it really means is that a thinker is 
representing something (1995a: 291). 
 Brentano’s influence on the Phenomenological school founded by Husserl is well-known. It 
took a little longer for his ideas to be introduced into analytic philosophy. This can largely be 
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credited to Roderick Chisholm, who was unusual among mainstream American philosophers of the 
time in having an active interest in Phenomenology, and published various things in the 1950s 
which took inspiration from Brentano (see CHAP. 44). Chisholm’s work, though valuable in itself, 
has led to a number of persistent misunderstandings of Brentano in the analytic tradition. His 
famous paper, ‘Sentences about Believing’ (Chisholm 1955-6), for example, attempted to 
reformulate Brentano’s criterion as a way of distinguishing between sentences describing mental 
phenomena and sentences describing physical phenomena, and of demonstrating the irreducibility 
of the mental to the physical, and hence the falsity of physicalism.  
 The criteria Chisholm came up with were in fact criteria for non-extensional linguistic 
contexts, usually known as intensional contexts: the failure of truth-functionality, the failure of 
substitution of co-referring terms to preserve truth-value, and the failure of existential 
generalisation. (On the relation between intentionality and intensional contexts, see Crane 2001 
Chapter 1, and Searle 1983 Chapter 1.) But Brentano’s distinction was not a distinction between 
linguistic contexts, and the idea that the mark of mental phenomena may be captured in this way is 
totally foreign to the project of his Psychology. Moreover, Brentano did not use his criterion to 
refute physicalism. Nonetheless, analytic philosophers persisted for a few decades in associating 
Brentano’s ideas with Chisholm’s, which only obstructed the proper understanding of Brentano. 
 A striking example of this can be found in W.V. Quine’s Word and Object (1960). In a 
famous and influential discussion of intension and meaning, Quine makes two claims about 
Brentano. The first is that ‘the Scholastic word “intentional” was revived by Brentano in connection 
with the verbs of propositional attitude and related verbs …— “hunt”, “want” etc.’. The second is 
that ‘there remains a thesis of Brentano’s, illuminatingly developed of late by Chisholm, that … 
there is no breaking out of the intentional vocabulary by explaining its members in other 
terms’ (Quine 1960: 219). As should be obvious from what I have said so far, both these claims are 
false. First, Brentano did not revive the Scholastic word ‘intentional’ to describe propositional 
attitude verbs, since as we saw, Brentano did not believe in propositional attitudes in anything like 
the 20th-century sense. (Curiously, the example of ‘hunt’ is from Quine’s own work (1956), not 
from Brentano’s; and nor could it be since hunting is not a mental phenomenon.) Second, 
Brentano’s thesis of the irreducibility of the intentional was not a claim about whether one can 
break out of the intentional vocabulary. It was not a claim about vocabulary at all: it was a claim 
about the categorial distinction between mental and physical phenomena. The natural conclusion to 
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draw from this is that Quine had never read Brentano, but took the description of his views 
wholesale from Chisholm. 
 Quine’s main concern was not, of course, the interpretation of Brentano, but the theory of 
meaning. However, Word and Object was an influential book, and inevitably the misunderstandings 
embodied in these casual remarks spread like diseases. To take just one example: in a famous paper, 
‘Mental Events’, Donald Davidson proposed a ‘test of the mental’ according to which the mental’s 
distinguishing feature is that ‘it exhibits what Brentano called intentionality’. He explains this by 
saying that ‘we may call those verbs mental that express propositional attitudes like believing, 
intending, desiring, hoping, knowing, perceiving, noticing, remembering, and so on’ (Davidson 
1980: 211). Here again we find mixed up with a real thesis of Brentano’s — that intentionality is the 
mark of the mental — the idea that intentional verbs are those that express propositional attitudes. 
Brentano’s thesis was about phenomena, not about verbs. And none of the mental phenomena in 
Brentano’s three categories — presentation, judgement and emotion — are propositional attitudes. 
Indeed, the notion of a propositional attitude itself was only introduced into philosophy some thirty 
years after Brentano’s Psychology was first published, in a 1904 paper by Bertrand Russell (‘belief 
is a certain attitude towards propositions, which is called knowledge when they are true, error when 
they are false’ (Russell 1904: 523)). Neither the term ‘propositional attitude’ nor the concept were 
current when Brentano wrote his Psychology; Davidson’s association of the idea with Brentano is as 
anachronistic as it is incorrect. 
 The problem here is not simply a failure in scholarship. It has also led to a misconception of 
the subject-matter itself. The association of the idea of intentionality with the logical properties of 
certain verbs took years to break. In recent years, rather than simply relying on Chisholm, Quine 
and Davidson, analytic philosophers have been reading Brentano’s actual texts for themselves, and 
finding inspiration in them for new developments in the study of intentionality and consciousness. 
There is reason to be optimistic that a better understanding of Brentano’s idea of intentionality is 
now emerging from this work.  1
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